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JUDGING THE JURY. By Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar. New 
York: Plenum Press. 1986. Pp. 285. $17.95. 
Our final judgment on the jury system is a positive one. Despite some 
flaws, it serves the cause of justice very well. For over 700 years it has 
weathered criticism and attack, always to survive and to be cherished by 
the peoples who own it. Adaptability has been the key to survival. It 
should remain open to experimentation and modification, but those who 
would wish to curtail its powers or abolish it should bear the burden of 
proof. Defenders of the jury have the weight of the evidence on their side. 
[p. 251] 
The constitutional right to a trial by jury is an almost sacred privi-
lege in the American legal system. In recent years the competence of 
juries has been attacked by judges, attorneys, and laymen who claim 
that juries fail to base their decisions upon legal precedent. These crit-
ics contend: (1) that juries base their decisions upon emotion; (2) that 
they are unable to understand complex evidence or legal theories; and 
(3) that they are willing to ignore the law in reaching what they con-
sider to be an equitable verdict (p. 20). Legal reformers claim that 
eliminating juries can improve the quality of trial verdicts and de-
crease both the cost and time involved with litigation. 
As a result of these criticisms, several major changes have oc-
curred in the American jury system in the past decade. These changes 
include the reduction in the size of juries and the discarding of the 
unanimity rule in many jurisdictions. Furthermore, some critics of the 
jury system, including former Chief Justice Warren Burger, have sug-
gested that there be an "exception rule" to the seventh amendment 
right to a jury trial in complex civil litigation.1 
In Judging the Jury, Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar2 combine the 
research of sociologists and legal scholars in an attempt to prove that 
1. See Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable: First Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, 
31 LoY. L. R.Ev. 205 (1985). 
2. Valerie P. Hans is an Associate Professor in the Division of Criminal Justice and Depart· 
ment of Psychology at the University of Delaware, where she specializes in psychology and law. 
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juries arrive at their verdicts through valid legal analysis, not incompe-
tence or emotionalism. The authors support their conclusions by ex-
amining the selection, trial process, and deliberation of juries in several 
actual trials. 3 Judging the Jury addresses the critical issues surround-
ing the American and Canadian jury systems and uses sociological re-
search to rebut the major criticisms of the jury process. 
After describing the historical development of the jury system in 
the United States, the authors examine the jury selection process. 
Hans and Vidmar stress that a jury must represent all segments of the 
community in order to be a fair decisionmaking body. The authors 
argue that to reach this goal of unbiased, equal representation, an ex-
tensive voir dire process in which opposing attorneys are allowed to 
question potential jurors at length is necessary. The authors contend 
that attorneys will become more effective in the voir dire process by 
using "scientific jury selection" techniques. 4 Hans and Vidmar then 
suggest that through the adversarial process, a balanced jury will be 
chosen as each attorney weeds out jurors biased against his or her cli-
ent. Yet, the authors realize that there are two major problems with 
this conclusion. 
First, the effectiveness of "scientific jury selection" techniques is 
questionable. It is doubtful whether these methods of jury selection 
can actually deliver the results their designers claim to achieve. 5 The 
authors point out that the success of parties who use these techniques 
may be due either to the diligence of counsel or to a weak opposing 
case rather than to the ability to select a favorable jury. A second and 
more important problem is the unequal availability of these techniques 
for wealthy and indigent parties. Only those litigants with substantial 
resources can obtain the benefit of "scientific jury selection" tech-
niques. Thus, the availability of these techniques may create an unfair 
advantage for wealthy parties, rather than the selection of unbiased, 
representative juries. 
The authors mention the problems with these techniques, but they 
Neil Vidmar is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 
and also holds a joint appointment with its School of Law. 
3. The cases the authors use to examine jury behavior include: the John DeLorean drug 
case, p. 13; the William Penn contempt of the king and his law case, p. 21; the John Peter Zenger 
seditious libel case, p. 32; the Dr. Spock conspiracy to counsel draft evasion case, p. 41; the Jack 
Ruby murder case, p. 47; the Joan Little murder case, p. 58; the Angela Davis conspiracy case, p. 
69; the Huey Newton murder trial, p. 70; the AT&T antitrust case, p. 79; the Scarsdale Doctor 
murder case, p. 97; the Norman Perl mail fraud and conspiracy case, p. 113; the John Hinckley 
case, p. 179; and the Big Dan's Bar rape case, p. 199. 
4. The scientific jury selection techniques the authors analyze consist primarily of demo-
graphic research procedures. These procedures include phone surveys of potential jurors, public 
opinion surveys, investigation of jury panel members, psychiatric sketches of potential jurors, 
mock trials, and shadow juries. See pp. 79-89. 
5. "Litigation Sciences advertises in its promotional brochure: 'To date, where our advice 
and recommendations have been employed, our clients have achieved successful results in over 
95 percent of the cases in which we have been involved.' " P. 90. 
1242 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1240 
fail to offer any solutions. The authors suggest that either (1) without 
the use of these jury selection methods, lawyers will be unable effec-
tively to pick out prejudicial jurors; or (2) that the use of these tech-
niques will create a disparate effect between poor and rich litigants. 
Hans and Vidmar recognize that the dilemma stems from the inherent 
inequities in the adversarial system, but they do not offer any sugges-
tions to alleviate those inequities. The authors' assumption that juries 
consist of a representative and unbiased sample of a community is cru-
cial to their defense of the jury system. However, such untainted ju-
ries will be difficult to assemble unless a method is developed to 
increase the ability of the voir dire process to screen out biased jurors 
without creating this disparate effect between wealthy and poor 
litigants. 
In the most innovative section of the book, Hans and Vidmar re-
spond to other significant criticisms of the jury system. The primary 
criticisms addressed are: (1) the jury's inability to decipher complex 
evidence; (2) the jury's inability to understand the law; (3) the jury's 
emotional decisionmaking; and ( 4) jury nullification. Relying on three 
major sociological studies6 of the jury system as well as research they 
conducted themselves, the authors provide convincing evidence to re-
fute these criticisms. The primary alternative to the current jury sys-
tem is to allow judges to decide the outcome of all litigation. Thus, to 
examine the validity of these criticisms, the authors use studies that 
compare jury decisions to the decisions that judges acting alone would 
have arrived at in the same cases. 
The studies cited suggest that the number of cases that judges 
would decide differently than juries is far fewer than critics of the sys-
tem contend. Also, the reasons for differences in opinion between 
judges and juries are different than jury critics believe them to be. 
Hans and Vidmar argue that any failure of the jury to understand the 
law is due not to jury incompetence, but to poor jury instructions and 
other procedural defects. 7 In some cases, the authors believe that ju-
ries are better suited to understanding evidence than judges because 
they are more likely to understand the testimony of their peers. 8 The 
6. See J. BALDWIN & M. McCoNVILLE, JURY TRIALS (1979); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, 
THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Meyers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and their Ver-
dicts, 13 LAW & SocY. REv. 781 (1979). 
7. Pp. 120-27. See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
8. Hans and Vidmar emphasize this idea by pointing out the miscommunication that occurs 
between cultural lines. In a trial in which the judge and jury were white and the defendant and 
all the witnesses were black, the defendant pleaded that the victim had put him "in the dozens." 
P. 138 (an extreme form of verbal aggression in the black ghetto). The jury did not understand 
this expression and convicted the defendant of second degree murder. 
The authors contend that "[t)he overwhelming majority of judges, as many studies have doc-
umented, are white, male, middle class, and conservative in outlook and in their life experiences. 
Their legal training prepares them for the language and culture of the white middle class." P. 
141. Hans and Vidmar argue that if the jury in this trial "had contained a few members from the 
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authors contend that rarely is the difference in opinion between judges 
and juries due to the jury's inability to understand evidence or law.9 
The criticisms of the jury system next addressed by Hans and Vid-
mar are jury nullification and emotional decisionmaking.10 The studies 
cited by the authors show that jury nullification of the law and jury 
decisions based on emotion are not as common as critics contend -
the "battle with the law" is a modest one. Further, Hans and Vidmar 
argue that because juries reflect community standards of justice, jury 
nullification will, in some cases, provide a more just decision than a 
judge's ruling. The cited studies suggest that in the majority of cases 
juries base their decisions on evidence and not emotion. Even when 
emotion does influence a jury's decision, the authors contend that this 
may be a positive influence. Like jury nullification, an emotional jury 
decision will many times produce a just verdict by reflecting commu-
nity standards and mores. Although Hans and Vidmar argue that 
emotion is a minor and sometimes positive influence on jury decisions, 
there are special cases in which jury emotion and nullification of the 
law can lead to bad decisions. 
The three kinds of cases that most often present problems for the 
jury system are rape, capital punishment, and the insanity defense. 
The final section of Judging the Jury asks how the jury system handles 
these cases. Hans and Vidmar contend that the insanity defense cre-
ates the least difficulty of these three for juries. Critics contend that 
juries do not understand insanity pleas and that they tend to place too 
much importance on psychiatric testimony. In response, the authors 
present limited studies11 to demonstrate that juries are not rubber 
stamps for psychiatric testimony and that the specific wording of jury 
instructions for the insanity defense does not have an overwhelming 
effect upon jury verdicts. The studies cited suggest that juries rely 
predominantly on the evidence concerning the circumstances of the 
black community, the verdict might have been different. In the jury room those jurors might 
have been able to explain to the others the implications of being put 'in the dozens.'" P. 142. 
9. Hans and Vidmar concede that juries usually fail correctly to follow the prohibition 
against allowing a defendant's past criminal record or the knowledge that the defendant is a 
"deep pocket" from influencing their decisions. Yet, the authors contend that if juries were given 
jury instructions before and after trials, were allowed to take notes, and were allowed to ask 
questions during testimony, their ability to remember and understand law and evidence would be 
greatly enhanced. See pp. 122-23. 
10. Jury nullification and emotional decisionmaking are separate yet closely related criti-
cisms of the jury system. Jury nullification occurs when the jury believe5 that a defendant is 
guilty under the given law, but refuses to convict because of the particular facts of the case. P. 
149. The classic example of jury nullification is when a jury refuses to convict in euthanasia 
cases. Emotional decisionmaking occurs when jurors' emotions taint their perceptions of the 
evidence so that they do not believe the defendant is guilty under the law. This often occurs in 
rape cases when jurors allow the past sexual experiences of the victim to influence their view of 
the crime. Seep. 131. 
11. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967). Simon's study was part 
of the Chicago jury project, but it only consisted of two simulated jury trials. 
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crime and are not overly influenced by legal complexities or psychiat-
ric testimony. The authors conclude that juries are actually better 
than judges at determining the validity of a defendant's insanity de-
fense because juries are representative of community standards. Thus 
juries, unlike judges, will evaluate a defendant's mental state using the 
standards of acceptable behavior that are prevalent in the community. 
Evidence suggests that cases involving rape present more of a prob-
lem for juries because of society's attitudes toward rape. 12 Since the 
jury will generally reflect social biases, juries in rape cases will "repre-
sent the anger, ambivalence, and myths that characterize public views 
of rape" (p. 204). Hans and Vidmar explain that because rape cases 
often pit the word of the victim against the word of the defendant, 
jurors base their decisions on their emotional impressions of the de-
fendant and of the victim, rather than on the evidence presented (pp. 
204-05). The authors concede that rape cases present a dilemma for 
the jury system. Often, verdicts will turn upon the past sexual activi-
ties of the victim or the moral character of the defendant. To avoid 
this problem, the authors advocate the use of rape shield laws to limit 
cross-examination of rape victims, and more specific jury instructions 
to decrease the influence of emotions on jurors' decisions. With these 
modifications, Hans and Vidmar argue that emotionally tainted deci-
sion making in rape cases can be decreased. 
Capital punishment cases present a unique problem for the jury 
system because of the arbitrariness of its application and the require-
ment in many jurisdictions that jurors be "death qualified."13 The au-
thors present evidence to demonstrate that jurors who are "death 
qualified" are usually biased towards the prosecution, thus defeating 
the basic assumption that juries are unbiased and representative of the 
community. To improve the jury system's ability to decide capital 
punishment cases, Hans and Vidmar advocate the use of a bifurcated 
jury system, 14 more specific jury instructions, and the abolishment of 
"death qualified" juries. But even with these improvements, Hans and 
Vidmar argue that the application of the death sentence is an arbitrary 
process tainted by racial prejudice. Thus, neither judges nor juries can 
12. While regarding rape with horror and the rapist as "contemptible," the public often 
holds the victim "responsible for her own victimization." P. 204. See Blumstein & Cohen, Sen-
tencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 LAW & SocY. REV. 223 
(1980) (surveying public sentiment on sentencing for a variety of offenses, including rape); Burt, 
Cultural Myths and Support for Rape, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 217 (1985). 
13. The "death qualified" statutes that exist in many jurisdictions do not allow jurors to sit 
on death penalty cases if they would never consider voting for a death sentence or they would 
vote not guilty to eliminate the possibility that the defendant would be sentenced to death. See 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
14. The Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which struck 
down several states' capital punishment laws because of due process flaws, caused the majority of 
states who had capital punishment statutes to adopt bifurcated trial systems. In these dual sys-
tems, separate juries are selected to decide the verdict and sentence in each capital punishment 
case. 
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sentence defendants to death in a just manner. The authors conclude 
that at present there are no improvements that can be made in the jury 
system to remove the basic unfairness of capital punishment verdicts. 
Hans and Vidmar state that the use of capital punishment is a moral 
issue that can only be dealt with by the Supreme Court and the Ameri-
can public. 
Judging the Jury provides a good starting point for the examina-
tion of the debate over the competence of the American and Canadian 
jury systems. Hans and Vidmar's book is a useful resource for both 
the advocate who wishes to refute the claims of jury critics and the 
layman who seeks to develop an understanding of the issues .involved 
in the jury debate. Although the authors present a strong argument in 
favor of the jury, Judging the Jury does not provide a conclusive an-
swer to the jury debate. Issues such as excessive jury verdicts, the 
expense of funding the jury system, the inefficiency of jury pool selec-
tion, and jury compensation are either not adequately discussed or not 
addressed at all in Judging the Jury. Nevertheless, Hans and Vidmar 
have succeeded in using the existing research and sociological data to 
present an intriguing defense of the jury system. 
- Eric M. Acker 
